Hubad ni Kyoko Selden
Textbook Inspection Which Denies Historical Truth
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Monbukagaskusho, hereafter Ministry of Education) on March 30, 2007 announced the selection of high school textbooks for use beginning in 2008. With respect to the question of compulsory mass suicide (shudan jiketsu) during the Battle of Okinawa, they demanded revision of statements saying that there was a suicide order (jiketsu meirei) or coercion (kyoyo) by the Japanese military. This refers to statements in seven textbooks published by five companies.
The gist of the Ministry of Education’s comments is this: "The order to commit suicide (jiketsu meirei) by the Japanese military cannot be verified. The suggestion that people were cornered into compulsory suicide by the Japanese military leads to a false understanding of the Battle of Okinawa. Okinawan prefectural citizens protested saying, "this distorts the truth of the Battle of Okinawa." The Okinawan Prefectural Assembly and all the municipal assemblies protested the ruling by the textbook examiners concerning military involvement in compulsory suicide, unanimously passing a resolution demanding retraction of the order to revise the texts.
However, the Ministry of Education rejected the claim of Okinawan citizens, merely reiterating that "The textbook inspection counsel decided this", and ignoring the unanimous view of Okinawan citizens.
Concerning the disaster experienced in the Battle of Okinawa, there have been various attempts to warp understanding and lead historical awareness astray.
One such move concerns the Tokashiki, Zamami, and Kerama islands of the Kerama Island group. The Japanese military on the Kerama Islands had 300 suicide attack boats and approximately 300 men in the marine advance corps, along with 600 affiliated members of a special water-surface work corps comprised of Koreans. There was also a locally-drafted defense corps and volunteer corps that were incorporated into the defense corps of the island.
The marine advance corps on Kerama Islands was the army’s suicide attack corps meant to destroy enemy ships with one-man suicide boats carrying 120 kilogram torpedoes. The actual situation of this corps has been the subject of exaggerated reports, but I understand that local people had discomforts and doubts about "the army’s marine suicide corps."
On March 26, 1945, the American military, with the support of artillery launched from both sea and sky began landing on Kerama Islands, and by the 29th had seized nearly the entire area. The fact is that the army’s attack boats did not attack even a single enemy boat.
During these battles, horrendous "mass suicide" (shudan jiketsu) of citizens occurred on Keruma, Zamami and Tokashiki Islands. This means that the inhabitants were forced to commit suicide by the coercion (kyosei) and inducement (yudo) of the Japanese military. But, the military leaders of the island now claim that "there was no military order."
The family of Akamatsu Yoshitsugu, the former colonel who headed the military on Tokashiki, and Umezawa Yutaka, the former major who headed the military on Zamami, brought suit in the Osaka court against Oe Kenzaburo and his publisher Iwanami for his book Okinawa Notes, on grounds of "disparaging their reputations" and demanded compensation for damages. Calling this trial a lawsuit on false charges concerning Okinawan mass suicides "Okinawa shudan jiketsu enzai sosho", they criticize Oe and Iwanami.
The plaintiffs claim that "Shudan jiketsu of inhabitants on Tokashiki and Zamani Islands were not by military order. They chose death with lofty self-sacrifice spirit."
This is not merely an issue of reputation damage, but a revisionist scheme to justify aggressive war and acquit the imperial army of responsibility for its atrocious deeds. Statements by former military officers in Okinawa, who welcome field surveys by groups like the Liberal View of History Group and government officials, are distorting understanding of the battle of Okinawa. The textbook review this time concerning shudan jiketsu, adopted without verification the claims by unit leaders who say there was no military order. The testimonies by the people of the islands who were forced to kill close relatives were probably ignored as not credible. They are looking at .things from the perspective that testimonies by the commanders alone have credibility. It is out of the question to use the one-sided claims by Akamatsu and Umezawa, who are involved in the lawsuit, as the foundation for textbook approval.
The Battle of Okinawa on Which the Maintenance of the National Polity (Kokutai) Rests
The Battle of Okinawa, fought with the understanding that Japan’s defeat was inevitable, was the last ground combat between Japan and the US in the Pacific War. For the Japanese imperial government, the maintenance of the national polity was the first principle, and gaining time to prepare for the decisive battle on the mainland and negotiations for the conclusion of the war were crucial.
Former prime minister Konoe Fumimaro, on January 14, 1945, right before the Battle of Okinawa, memorialized to the emperor that the war situation had reached a grave situation.
"Regrettably, defeat in the war has already become inevitable . . . . Defeat in the war will constitute a great flaw for our national polity (kokutai), but the consensus of England and the US has not yet gone so far as reforming (henkaku) the national polity . . .Therefore, if it is just defeat in the war, I do not think that we need worry so much in terms of national polity . . . What we have most to fear from the viewpoint of the maintenance of the national polity, is communist revolution which could occur following defeat in the war.
"Therefore, from the perspective of preserving the national polity, I am convinced that we should think about the way to conclude the war as soon as possible, by even a single day . . . ." (Hosokawa Morisada, Hosokawa Nikki (Hosokawa Diary))
The report by former Prime Minister Konoe is remarkable for openly explaining to the emperor the need to conclude the war as a member of the Japanese leadership. But the main point is that although defeat in the war was inevitable, rather than defeat itself, he was most concerned about the disintegration of the ruling structure by the imperial system (tennosei shihai kiko) by a communist revolution. To Konoe’s advice the emperor responded "I think it is quite difficult unless we achieve a military result just once more." This indicates that the Showa emperor, even at this late point, had passion for leading the war effort.
The battle of Okinawa was "a battle on which the national polity hung," yet one which presupposed Japan’s defeat. It is said that Okinawa served as "a stone to discard for the sake of the defense of the mainland," but in fact it was "a battle to postpone the decisive battle on the mainland" and to gain some time for the preparation of that battle on the mainland and to negotiate the end of the war, and was not a battle to protect the people (kokumin) of the mainland. It was a preliminary battle before eventually taking the entire nation (kokumin subete) to death along with the Emperor.
The Japanese imperial government, in preparation for the final battle on the mainland, reinforced its total war system intended to mobilize the entire nation.
On May 22, 1945, the wartime education law (senji-kyoiku rei) was made public and even elementary schools and schools for the blind, deaf and dumb were ordered to organize student military units. On June 23, when the Okinawa defending force (32nd Battalion) was defeated and systematic fighting ended, a volunteer soldiers law was promulgated and women, too, were ordered to serve in national volunteer combat units.
On July 8, 1945 in Tokyo, military units of the Okinawan Normal School and the Okinawan Prefectural First Middle School were honored in a ceremony without the presence of the awardees. Minister of Education Ota Kozo told students throughout the country to follow the student military units of Okinawa and dedicate their lives in order to defend the national polity. (Asahi Shinbun July 9, 1945).
When the Japanese imperial government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, maintenance of the national polity was the central issue.
On August 6 and 9, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, destroying the cities. But the Japanese leadership was preoccupied with the threat of Soviet entry into the war, more than with the destructiveness of the atomic bomb.
On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union renounced the Soviet Union-Japan neutrality treaty, declared war and attacked Manchuria, Sakhalin, and North Korea. Consequently, the Japanese leadership felt the crisis of the imperial system and decided to bring the war to conclusion.
In the middle of the night on August 9, an imperial conference was held. At 2:30 a.m. on the 10th they accepted the Potsdam Declaration on condition of the maintenance of the national polity (kokutai goji). This was called an imperial decision.
Anami Korechika, then Minister of the Army, writes in his diary:
"With the understanding that the conditions stated in the three countries’ combined declaration dated from the 26th of last month do not include the demand to change the emperor’s prerogative to rule the state, the Japanese government accepts this."
A Japanese politician has said that by dropping the atomic bombs "Japan’s defeat was made earlier, so it can’t be helped." [The reference is to former Defense Min. Kyuma Fumio. Tr.] But this is a thoughtless statement by one who follows US policies while being ignorant of the affliction of citizens.
Why did the US drop the atomic bombs? Young people who have studied in Hiroshima and Nagasaki the reality of the bombing explain their findings clearly as follows.
- The US wanted to carry out attacks on the cities to display the bomb’s power. The ability to destroy with shock waves and ultra-high heat, the influence on human bodies and the environment by radioactivity. The atomic bomb is not a matter of a single moment à there is also secondary radiation and radiation in the womb. Hibakusha are not only Japanese à there were also Koreans and Chinese forced laborers (kyosei renko) as well as allied POWs.
- They proudly flaunted the power of the atomic bomb to the Soviet leadership, a strategy that anticipated the US-Soviet postwar conflict.
- The B-29 which set out from Tinian in Micronesia at 2:49 a.m. on August 9 dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki at 11:02. That aircraft landed at Bolo Airport in Yomitan in the main Okinawan island at 1:09 on the 9th. After refueling it returned to Tinian at 22:55 on the 9th. At that time, US forces in Okinawa had set up an airport with a 2,000 meter runway that could accommodate B29s.
Compulsory Mass Suicide Forced by the Imperial Army
The Okinawa defense force issued a directive to Okinawan prefectural citizens calling for unification of the army, government and civilians living together and dying together (kyosei kyoshi), and stating that even a single tree or blade of grass should be a fighting power. They mobilized for battle all people, down to young and old, women and children.
The military and paramilitary locally recruited in Okinawa numbered more than 25,000 (soldiers on active duty, drafted soldiers, defense units, student units, volunteer units, etc.). We have to realize that one fourth of the Okinawa defense force were "Japanese soldiers" coming out of Okinawa prefecture. It is a mistake to think that Japanese forces in the battle of Okinawa were exclusively officers and men from the mainland (Yamato troops).
During the last stages of the battle of Okinawa (June-July) the American forces indiscriminately attacked Japanese forces and residents of the area within caves and called this "Jap hunting".
The imperial army drove residents from shelters, took their food, prohibited them from surrendering, tortured and slaughtered them on grounds of suspected spying. They forced people into "mutual killing" among close relatives, and left the sick and handicapped on the battlefield.
The war dead among civilians in the battle of Okinawa is estimated at more than 150,000.
When we think about the damage to citizens in the battle of Okinawa, shudan jiketsu can be raised as the most peculiar case.
First of all we have to clarify the term shudan jiketsu.
When we say "jiketsu" (self-determination, suicide) the precondition is "spontaneity, voluntariness of those who choose death." It is impossible for infants and toddlers to commit "jiketsu" and there is no one who spontaneously kills close relatives.
Mutual killing of close relatives, meaning that "parents kill young children, children kill parents, big brothers kill little brothers and sisters, and husbands kill their wives," occurred on the battlefield where the imperial army and citizens mingled.
In Army Strategies in the Okinawa Area compiled by the War History Office of the Ministry of Defense, it is written: "They achieved shudan jiketsu and died for the imperial country with a sacrificial spirit in order to end the trouble brought on combatants." But this claim goes against the facts. Citizens on the battlefield did not choose death voluntarily.
Although there are numerous interrelated factors, basically people were forced to kill close relatives by compulsion of the imperial army and local leaders who followed the imperial army. Enforcing the mutual killing of close relatives is of the same quality and the same root as the killing of citizens by the imperial army.
One cannot call the death of people who "were forced" or "cornered" shudan jiketsu [if the term indicates voluntary suicide]. It is improper to call this reality shudan jiketsu. Hindering properly conveying reality, it invites misunderstanding and confusing.
The term shudan jiketsu has been used since the 1950s and some say that "it walks on its own with an established meaning," but if one uses the term shudan jiketsu without explaining the realities behind it, that invites misunderstanding and confusion. The reality of the term shudan jiketsu, I must reiterate, is "residents mass death by the imperial army’s coercion and inducement."
Behind "residents mass death" in the Battle of Okinawa was imperial subject education (education to make everyone an imperial subject) which rendered dying for the emperor the supreme national morality (kokumin dotoku). In the Battle of Okinawa, "the unification of the military, government, and civilians living together and dying together" was emphasized, and "a sense of solidarity about death" was cultivated. At that moment, knowledgeable Okinawans played essential roles, including those in the Association of Reservists, the Support Group of Adult Men, and police and military affairs chiefs of local and municipal government.
When given hand grenades by the Japanese military, leaders of the islands accepted them, thinking it natural that "all residents die when the moment demands". We cannot, however, think of this as "spontaneity and voluntariness" of "shudan jiketsu". This was an era when it was impossible to decline "death" ordered by the imperial army.
The extreme fear of "brute Americans and British" [cultivated by the Japanese military] was a factor that made people choose death. Japanese military experiences of slaughter of Chinese people on the continent since the "Manchurian Incident" was widely discussed; and about the fate of residents at large at the time when the war turned out to be a "losing battle", people despaired anticipating plunder, violence, slaughter by the American military. There were returned migrants who thought "the American military can no way be expected to kill residents", but returnees were regarded as suspected spies and hence were unable to speak positively. To make such a statement was to court denunciation as a spy and slaughtered.
There are people who were driven by the perverse idea that, rather than seeing female siblings and wives being killed cruelly and outraged by brute Americans and Brits, it was an act of love by close relatives to kill them with their own hands.
The fear of spy hunting by the imperial army accentuated the sense of despair among residents. The imperial army’s policy was never to hand over residents who knew military secrets. To accept the protection of the US military was regarded as spying. Residents positioned between the Japanese and American military were driven to "death". Their hope to live was cut off by the shelling of the islands. Knowing that there was no escape route, they anticipated a cruel death. That too was one cause of their "hurrying to death".
"Mass death of residents" took place when these elements joined together, causing panic that led to mutual killing of close relatives in local communities. Fear and madness overwhelmed village communities. ?
"Mass Death" in Encircled Areas
At the time of the Battle of Okinawa, had lost the control of the sea and sky of the entire area of the Southwest islands had passed to the US military. Communication and transportation with Kyushu and Taiwan were cut off and the islands were surrounded. The Okinawa defending force gave orders about matters involving the jurisdiction of the prefectural and local governments, unifying the military, government and civilians to live together and die together. All actions of prefectural citizens were controlled by commanders of stationed forces. Here there was no civil government. This kind of battlefield was designated "encirclement areas" in military terminology. These areas were designated by "martial law" as ones to be on the alert when surrounded or attacked by the enemy.
In such areas, commanders of stationed forces wielded full power. This overrode the constitution, and all legislation, administration and jurisprudence were under military control. During the Battle of Okinawa, martial law was not proclaimed, but the entire Southwest islands were virtual encirclement areas. It was for this circumstance that the administrative authority of the prefectural governor and mayors of villages was ignored and the stationed forces handled everything as they pleased. Directives and orders to local residents were received as "military orders" even if conveyed by town and village governments and local leaders.
On Tokashiki Island of the Keremas, Col. Akamatsu Yoshitsugu wielded total authority. On Zamami Island, Major Umezawa Yutaka held complete authority. The village administration was placed under the control of the military; there was no civil administration. Under military rule, those who played an important role in communicating military orders were military affairs directors of the village office.
These were local leaders who took charge of military affairs including coordination of the draft list, verification of the whereabouts of people of draft age, handling of such things as draft delay petitions, distribution of draft cards, and aid to bereft families of war dead and wounded soldiers.
The main duty of military affairs directors at the time of the Battle of Okinawa was to draft soldiers demanded by the stationed forces, to hand them over to the army and to communicate military orders (supply of labor power, evacuation, assembly and eviction) to the residents.
Toyama Majun, who was a chief of military affairs of the village of Tokashiki, testifies:
- March 20, 1945, a messenger came from the Akamatsu unit and ordered Toyama Majun to muster residents of Tokashiki village at the village office. In compliance with the directive from the military, he collected "boys under the age of 17 and officials of the village office" in the front yard of the office.
- At that point a low-ranking officer called the ordnance sergeant had his subordinates bring two boxes of hand grenades and handed two grenades to each of the twenty plus people who gathered. He gave this instruction: "The landing of the US military and the annihilation of Tokashiki Island is inevitable. If you encounter the enemy, throw one at the enemy and, if there is fear of being captured, commit suicide with the remaining one."
- On March 29, the day that US forces landed on Tokashiki, a military order was conveyed to Toyama, the head of village military affairs. The content was: "Collect residents near the Nishiyama Camp." Policeman Asato Kijun of the police substation also went round conveying this order to residents.
- On March 28 at Fijiga (katakana) in the upper reaches of the On’na river, the collective death (shudanshi) incident of residents occurred. At that time, defense unit members brought hand grenades and urged residents to commit "suicide".
This testimony by the military affairs director vividly conveys the reality of residents "shudanshi". One can see that a military affairs director, who conveys the military order in an encirclement area, bore a crucial responsibility. Japanese citizens had been taught that a military order was "the emperor’s order". There was also the aspect that people believed that "choosing death" rather than become POWs was "the way of imperial subjects". They were, in accord with the instruction of local leaders and the imperial army, made to implement the field service code (senjinkun), which said "Do not live to receive the humiliation of becoming a prisoner".
Kini nga artikulo gimantala sa Gunshuku mondai shiryo (Disarmament Review), December 2007. Aniya Masaaki is Professor emeritus of Modern Japanese History at Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku, (Okinawa International University).
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